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Getting What They Came For
How Power Infl uences 




M any social interactions are indelibly tinged by issues of power and of power diff erences. Consider some common social interactions: First, imagine a job candidate going in for an interview with a po-
tential employer. Next, consider a teacher meeting new students on the fi rst day 
of class. Th en, imagine two people meeting for a fi rst date. Finally, imagine two 
college roommates meeting for the fi rst time at the beginning of the semester. 
Each of these scenarios contains at least two common features, which together 
set the stage for the arguments that are off ered in this chapter. First, each sce-
nario involves a situation in which two people are meeting for the fi rst time— 
the participants are getting acquainted with one another. Second, in each sce-
nario, there are considerations of power that may infl uence the dynamics and 
the outcomes of the interactions that occur between the participants.
Few would argue with the assertion that, in the fi rst two situations, the in-
dividuals involved are characterized by diff erent amounts of social power—in 
classrooms, teachers typically have more power than students and, in an em-
ployment interview, the potential employer has a great deal of power over the 
outcomes of the potential employee. Th e role-based power diff erences in the 
fi rst two examples are fairly obvious, for the roles of teacher and of employer 
explicitly confer power over students and employees. However, even these two 
situations may have power dynamics that are more complex than a surface-lev-
el analysis would suggest. And, examining the complexity of power diff erences
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will make it clear that power diff erences may well be present even in the lat-
ter two scenarios, the fi rst date and the roommate meeting. Th ese scenarios, al-
though not marked by obvious role related diff erences in social power, contain 
features such as diff erences in knowledge, expertise, or investment that may lead 
to power diff erences emerging.
Th e focus of this chapter is on an exploration of how power infl uences the 
dynamics of interpersonal interactions such as the ones in the examples, and 
how these power infl uenced dynamics determine the outcomes of interactions. 
First the nature and the complexities of the power diff erences present in these 
sorts of interactions are described, and then an exploration of the relation of 
power to the dynamics and outcomes of such interactions is presented.
THE COMPLEXITY OF POWER DIFFERENCES
An important preliminary to discussing the nature of these power complexi-
ties is to fi rst delineate what is meant by power. For the purposes of this discus-
sion, the widely accepted defi nition of power proposed by French and Raven 
(1959; see also Bannester, 1969; Huston, 1983) is used. Th is way of consider-
ing power has received widespread attention, and acceptance, in the research 
literature (see Podsakoff  & Schriesheim, 1985, for a review). According to the 
French and Raven analysis of the bases of power, a person’s social power is de-
fi ned as the extent to which that person has the potential ability to infl uence 
another person in a given setting. Th is infl uence may take a number of forms. 
Th e most straightforward form of this infl uence occurs when a high power per-
son infl u ences the actual behaviors of a lower power person, but the potential 
for infl u ence may also extend to creating changes in a person’s thoughts and be-
liefs, or eliciting changes in the persons aff ective states (see also Raven, 1992).
Turning back to the initial examples of dyadic interaction, the form of pow-
er diff erence in the fi rst two examples (the teacher and the new student, the em-
ployer and the prospective employee) is that of legitimate power, which French 
and Raven defi ne as the ability to infl uence another because of a socially pro-
scribed role giving legitimacy to ones infl uence. In our society, teachers are sup-
posed to have infl uence over their students and employers are allowed to in-
fl uence their employees. Two other fairly clearly defi ned forms of social pow-
er present in these fi rst two dyads are those of reward and coercive (or punish-
ment) power. Clearly teachers have the ability to give rewards (e.g., good grades, 
praise) and punishments to infl uence the behaviors of their students. Employers 
also have a variety of rewards and punishments (e.g., job positions, salaries, other 
benefi ts) to infl uence employee behavior. Although these types of power diff er-
ences may also from time to time be present in the date and roommate situa-
tions, they are less likely to be a central feature of those sorts of interactions.
However, the power dynamics in even these fi rst two situations are far more 
complex than this initial analysis would suggest. Delving deeper into each sit-
uation, it seems that three other bases of power posited by French and Raven
(1959, and further elaborated by Raven, 1992,1993) are also present in the fi rst 
two examples, and have every potential to be present in the latter two as well. 
Consider fi rst expert power, the ability to infl uence because one is seen as an ex-
pert on a particular issue and therefore should be believed and obeyed. Clearly, 
in classroom settings, the teacher is viewed as the expert on a variety of issues 
and thus has power to infl uence the student. Similarly, in an employment inter-
view, an applicant may submit to the infl uence of the interviewer because that 
person is seen as the expert on matters relating to ones employment in a par-
ticular position. In the fi rst date scenario, one member of the dyad may be more 
likely to be seen as the expert dater by virtue of age, dating experience, general 
sociability, and so forth. Similarly, in the roommate situation, one per son may 
be seen as an expert on a particular subject, such as information about social 
life, or may be generally viewed as the person to go to with questions, thus con-
ferring expert power.
Reference power, or power conferred because one feels (or wants to feel) a 
sense of identity or oneness with the person, also plays a role in each of these 
situations. Teachers are powerful socialization agents, and the desire to be like 
the teacher may lead to the teacher having reference power over the student. In 
an employment setting, the interviewee is presumably there, in part, be cause she 
or he wants to become a part of the employer’s in group—to join the company. 
Th us, in each of these situations, reference power maybe present. In addition, in 
the dating and roommate scenarios, one person may have a stron ger desire (per-
haps because the other person is very attractive, very popular, or has other de-
sirable qualities) to be friends or to develop a relationship. Th is desire gives the 
other person more reference power (e.g., Peplau, 1979; Waller & Hill, 1951).
Finally, consider informational power, the ability to infl uence based on the 
higher power person having information that the lower power person does not 
possess. Clearly, teachers and employers have, respectively, more academic and 
more workplace information than do students and potential employees. In the 
context of a fi rst date, the person who initiated the date often has more infor-
mation, since she or he presumably knows more about the planned activities to 
take place. If the date is to be to a play, concert, or movie, the member of the 
dyad who knows what movies are playing and what plays are showing may have 
more informational power. With roommates, one may have information that 
the other needs in order to interact smoothly with other residents or to partici-
pate in dorm activities.
A second important type of knowledge that may lead to informational pow-
er diff erences is information about the other person in the dyad. Typically, teach-
ers have a variety of kinds of information about their students before they meet 
on the fi rst day of class. Th ey have the students permanent record, have prob-
ably discussed the students progress with other teachers, and may have heard 
about the student from other sources. Likewise, an employer often has a great 
deal of information about the employee—a resume, references from former em-
ployers, and perhaps results from a battery of selection tests.
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In the dating situation, one member of a dating dyad may well have more 
knowledge about the other, particularly if the two were set up by a mutual ac-
quaintance. One roommate may have knowledge about the other as a result 
of campus gossip, information from other students, or other informal sources. 
Th ese informational diff erences create a power diff erential such that the teacher, 
the employer, the date, and the roommate each have more power than the other 
member of the dyad.
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER
In this chapter, we will consider the eff ects that diff erences in power have 
on dyadic interactions including, but not limited to, those discussed above. 
We will focus our discussion on understanding how power diff erences infl u-
ence the behaviors that ensue during interactions between individuals marked 
by high and low power, as well as the infl uence of power on the outcomes of 
these interactions. First the sorts of infl uences power has on the dynamics of 
interac tions is examined. Next, how and why power infl uences these interac-
tions is discussed. Finally, some observations and speculations concerning the 
implica tions of this analysis for several phenomena in social and personality 
psychology are off ered.
WHAT EFFECTS DOES POWER HAVE IN 
INTERPERSONAL INTERACTION?
Given the richness (and possibly even the pervasiveness) of power diff erences 
inherent in many interpersonal interactions, it is critical to understand the dy-
namic infl uence of power on the processes involved in, and the outcomes of, in-
teractions. It is possible to consider the role of power dynamics at many points 
in the interpersonal interaction sequence. First, power may infl uence the ini-
tial choice of partners with whom to interact (Kerckhoff , 1974; Parks & Egg-
ert, 1991). In a business setting, for example, a higher power person may simply 
choose not to interact with a subordinate because the subordinate has no con-
trol over the higher power person’s outcomes. Conversely, the low power person 
may elect not to interact with the higher power person for fear of doing some-
thing to negatively impact the higher power persons control over outcomes.
Next, power can determine the fi rst impressions formed about an interac-
tion partner—power diff erences can infl uence the likelihood of using individu-
ating information about a person versus relying on expectations and stereo-
types (Fiske, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). For example, the high power su-
pervisor in a work setting may rely on information about the employee gar-
nered from others or on ideas about what “that sort of employee” is like when 
forming an impression.
Finally, power can have implications for choosing to continue or discon-
tinue an interaction. High power people may well have far more freedom to 
exit from interactions they do not enjoy or do not fi nd productive, since their 
out comes are not dependent on the lower power person (Gelles, 1976; Huston, 
1983; Strube, 1988). A high power business person can choose to stop interact-
ing with the lower power person without fear of losing his or her job, position, 
or salary, a freedom not accorded to the lower power person.
In this chapter, we will address the role of power in interaction by focusing 
in on one critically important stage of this interaction sequence, namely the ini-
tial interaction in which people get acquainted with one another. Two main is-
sues are addressed: First, the eff ects of power on the dynamics of these initial 
interactions, and second, the question of how and why power infl uences inter-
actions. Th e motivations that individuals with diff ering levels of social power 
might bring to such interactions and how those motivations might lead them 
to conduct themselves in ways that lead to particular interaction dynamics are 
discussed.
Why might these initial acquaintanceship settings be a particularly appro-
priate venue within which to study power dynamics? Obviously, interactions 
and relationships must have beginnings, and these beginnings importantly set 
the stage for any further interactions and relationship development to come 
(see Murstein, 1976). Th us, the importance of these initial interactions cannot 
be understated. Th e impressions formed in these initial interactions color the 
remainder of the relationship between the individuals, whether that relation-
ship lasts for ten minutes or ten years (e.g., Asch, 1940; Hovland, Janis, & Kel-
ley, 1953). Second, these initial interactions are situations in which the eff ects 
of power can be easily and productively observed and manipulated; since the 
in teractions are not yet tinged by a history of relationship, it may well be easier 
to observe the dynamics and eff ects of power in these early interaction settings. 
Finally, a large body of work on interpersonal interaction has concerned this 
initial person perception and initial acquaintanceship process, making it a use ful 
venue to relate analyses of power to other relevant research fi ndings (e.g., Hays, 
1985; Kerckhoff , 1974; Murstein, 1976; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977).
A STRATEGY FOR EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF POWER
An initial question is this: How do power diff erences in a dyad infl uence the 
process of initial acquaintanceship and interpersonal interaction? To explore 
this question, consider a setting that has features common to interpersonal ac-
quaintanceship and which also contains power diff erences. What features of ac-
quaintanceship might be important here? Obviously, we need a setting in which 
two previously unacquainted individuals are meeting and interacting for the 
fi rst time. But consider also that, when individuals interact for the fi rst time, 
they frequently come to that initial meeting with a set of preexisting expecta-
tions about the other person. Th ese expectations can develop from many sourc-
es. For example, stereotypes about a group to which the person belongs can be a
source of beliefs about what the person will be like. Also, one may have re ceived 
information about the person from a common acquaintance. In the ex amples 
above, factual information, such as resumes or school records, can pro vide a 
source for a mental picture of what the person will be like.
In addition to being a common feature of interpersonal acquaintanceship, 
these expectations have the potential to be a source of power diff erences in their 
own right. Recall the earlier discussion about informational power diff er ences 
as a result of one person knowing more about the other. To the extent that ex-
pectations are unequally distributed across members of the dyad (as they will 
surely be when one party to the interaction approaches it with prior expecta-
tions and the other does not), the person with more expectations has more in-
formation (even if that information is not accurate) and thus has some informa-
tional power over the other member of the dyad.
Our strategy for addressing the infl uences of power on acquaintanceship is 
to delve into the dynamics of a well-studied process of interpersonal interac tion, 
that of behavioral confi rmation (Snyder, 1984, 1992). Behavioral confi r mation 
scenarios have both of the features defi ned as important for this chapters ex-
ploration of power. First, the scenario is set up for two previously unacquainted 
individuals to interact. Second, the very nature of the behavioral confi rmation 
scenario is such that one person has been provided with an expectation about 
the other person which, as discussed above, leads to the person with the expec-
tation having informational power.
What is Behavioral Confi rmation?
As we have pointed out above, a common feature of acquaintanceship interac-
tions is that the individuals frequently have expectations about each other. 
Th ese expectations play an important guiding role in how we perceive the oth-
er per son—both our perceptions of who they are (e.g., their personalities) and 
our perceptions of what they do (e.g., their behaviors). In this sense, what we 
see when we interact with the person is a function of what we expect to see—a 
phenomenon referred to as perceptual confi rmation (Snyder, 1984).
Perceptual confi rmation is an interesting phenomenon in its own right, for 
the purposes here, an even more intriguing eff ect of these preconceived expec-
tations is the infl uence that they can have on behavior towards the target of 
those expectations, and ultimately on the actual behaviors of that target per-
son. People may choose behaviors based on their expectations of what the oth-
er person will be like (e.g., we will be very talkative with the person we believe 
to be extraverted). Behavior based on those expectations, however, can have im-
portant consequences—the actions of the holder of the expectations can lead 
the target of those expectations to actually behave in ways that confi rm those 
original beliefs. Th is process has been referred to by a number of names in the 
research literature (e.g., expectancy eff ects (Rosenthal, 1994) and self-fulfi ll-
ing prophesies (Merton, 1948; Jussim, 1986). For our discussion, we will choose
the term behavioral confi rmation (Snyder, 1984), for it specifi cally refers to the 
defi ning aspects of the phenomenon—the person’s behavior is such that it con-
fi rms our expectations about them.
A Prototypic Demonstration of Behavioral Confi rmation
In an early demonstration of the behavioral confi rmation eff ect, Snyder, Tanke, 
and Berscheid (1977) had previously unacquainted male-female dyads interact 
over an intercom system (so that they could talk to, but not see, one another). 
Prior to the conversation, the researchers manipulated the male member of the 
dyads expectations about the female member. To do this, they gave each male 
participant (who we will refer to as the perceiver) a picture ostensibly of his fe-
male partner (who we will refer to as the target). In reality, the picture was not 
of the target, but rather was a picture that was randomly assigned to be of either 
a physically attractive or a physically unattractive woman.
Based on this manipulation, the male perceivers entered into the acquain-
tanceship conversation with an expectation about their partner—an expecta-
tion based on, depending on condition, stereotypes of attractive or unattract-
ive women. Th ese stereotypes include the idea that attractive women are more 
sociable, more outgoing, and more interpersonally warm than are unattractive 
women. Th e perceiver-target dyads then engaged in a 10 minute, unstructured 
conversation. Following the conversation, the male perceiver rated his impres-
sions of the female target. Th e target’s side of the conversation was then coded 
by independent raters for the amount of outgoingness, warmth, and sociability 
she displayed.
Th e results of the study showed that targets whose partners believed them 
to be physically attractive behaved during the interaction in ways that led them 
to be seen by independent raters as more sociable, warm, and outgoing than did 
targets whose perceivers believed them to be unattractive. Th e initial be liefs that 
the male perceivers held about their female targets turned into self-fulfi lling 
prophesies in the course of their interactions—the targets behaved in ways that 
actually confi rmed their perceivers beliefs.
Why is the Behavioral Confi rmation Paradigm a Useful Way 
to Address Issues of Power?
Let us consider now the ways in which behavioral confi rmation paradigms may 
address issues of power. Th e informational power diff erences that are a defi n-
ing feature of the confi rmation scenario were presented earlier. However, in ad-
dition to this informational power diff erence, examining the procedural para-
digms used in behavioral confi rmation studies through the lens of power sug-
gests that there may be other aspects of power built into these paradigms. In-
formational power is discussed formally below, then some of these additional 
power diff erences are addressed.
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Informational Power: Asymmetry of Knowledge. As discussed previ ously, 
the experimental paradigm for studying behavioral confi rmation by its very na-
ture creates situations in which the perceiver, by virtue of having an expectation, 
possesses greater informational power than does the target. Th e nature of the ex-
perimental manipulation is that the perceiver is given a piece of information—an 
expectation—about the target. Of course this informational manipulation is criti-
cal to the examination of confi rmation as experimenters must give the perceiver 
an expectation in order to examine whether that expec tation has been perceptu-
ally and behaviorally confi rmed. An unintended side eff ect of this presentation of 
information, however, is that the perceiver has information and the target does 
not, which puts the perceiver in a position of having informational power (French 
& Raven, 1959) in that they are given a sense of what to expect of the target and, 
more generally, what to expect to occur in the situation.
Of course, having this knowledge also puts the perceiver in the position of 
having additional opportunities to act on the expectations given. Th is function-
ally puts the target in the position of responding to the perceiver’s conversa-
tional guidance, providing information about themselves. Th is power to initiate 
and control the fl ow of information may be another important determinant of 
the confi rmation eff ects observed. In many confi rmation scenarios, this power 
creates a fl ow of infl uence from perceiver to target because the perceiver is elic-
iting information from the target (Mobilio & Snyder, 1996). Th is fl ow of infor-
mation and control is, by itself, related to power diff erences (Mullen, Salas, & 
Driskell, 1989; Ng, Bell, & Brooke, 1993).
Th e same sort of analysis can highlight the inherently low power position 
of the target. Th e target operates from an initial position of information defi cit. 
Th e experimental manipulation creates a situation in which the target doesn’t 
know about the perceiver what the perceiver knows about the target. Th is defi -
cit of information puts the target in the functional position of needing to act off  
of cues provided by the perceiver—giving them relatively little power to con trol, 
guide, and shape the conversation.
Legitimate Power: Role Differences. In addition to the informational 
power that is inherent in the behavioral confi rmation interactional paradigm, 
addi tional power diff erences may exist. Although not originally intended to test 
the role of diff erent types of power in interpersonal interactions, many clas-
sic dem onstrations of behavioral confi rmation eff ects have in eff ect included 
legitimate power as an implicit feature by nature of their experimental para-
digm. Several studies have, either naturalistically or experimentally, used role 
relationships in which the perceiver has more power than the target. For exam-
ple. Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) studied interactions between job inter-
viewer perceivers and job applicant targets, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) ex-
amined teachers’ per ceptions of their students, and both Harris and Rosenthal 
(1986) and Snyder and Copeland (1995) studied interactions between perceiv-
ing counselors and client targets.
Summary: Power and Confi rmation
Power diff erences, as we have seen, are imbedded into the functional roles of 
perceivers and targets in behavioral confi rmation scenarios. Th e power status-
es in the dyad covary with the roles they are assigned in the interaction. Th is 
state of aff airs could be mere coincidence, but one might also hypothesize that 
per haps perceptual, and particularly behavioral, confi rmation are phenomena of 
power due, perhaps, to the high power position inherent in the perceiver role 
and the low power position that characterizes the target.
PUTTING TOGETHER THE PIECES: 
DO POWER DIFFERENCES ACCOUNT 
FOR BEHAVIORAL CONFIRMATION EFFECTS?
To begin to put the pieces of power and behavioral confi rmation together one 
must look at the causal role of power in leading to behavioral confi rmation ef-
fects. Th e literature on behavioral confi rmation that has been reviewed thus far 
in this chapter tentatively suggests the possibility that behavioral confi rmation 
may be one important eff ect of power diff erentials in dyadic interaction. Th at is, 
situations characterized by a relatively powerful perceiver (by virtue of ei ther a 
given position or by virtue of informational power diff erences) and a relatively 
powerless target are situations in which confi rmation eff ects are ob served. In 
these situations, expectations held by the perceiver about the target lead to the 
target behaving in ways that confi rm those expectations.
In addition, the nature of the expectations held by perceivers may enhance 
the role of power in leading to confi rmation. Behavioral confi rmation may be 
facilitated by expectations that are dispositional in nature, as such expectations 
may provide relatively simple and clear cut guidelines for interacting with the 
target in ways that may elicit confi rmatory actions from them. Moreover, form-
ing expectations that are relatively simple, clear cut, and dispositional in nature 
may be facilitated by paying relatively little attention to individuating informa-
tion about the target and the infl uence of the context of the situation on the 
targets behavior in that situation. In fact, research has shown that high power 
people are less likely to pay attention to their interaction partners (e.g., Fiske, 
1993), which may make them particularly likely to form simple, clear cut dispo-
sitional expectations of targets, which in turn may set the stage for confi rmation 
to be particularly likely to occur.
Of course, to confi dently conclude that the eff ects observed are in fact a re-
sult of the inherent power diff erentials between perceivers and targets, and that 
behavioral confi rmation is in reality a phenomenon of power, the evidence of a 
study that directly tests this possibility by manipulating power diff erentials or-
thogonal to expectations is needed. Such a study was done by Copeland (1994). 
Copeland gave perceivers an expectation about the extraversion of their inter-
action partner—the partner was reported to be either rather introverted or rather
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extraverted. Orthogonal to that manipulation, Copeland manipulated the rela-
tive power of the participants such that either the perceiver or the target was 
the more powerful member of the dyad. Th is manipulation was done by giving 
the powerful member control over participation in a subsequent task in which 
rewards could be earned.
If behavioral confi rmation results from the power inequities in the dyad, 
these eff ects should be exacerbated when the perceiver is the high power per-
son (since the experimentally manipulated power adds on to their existing in-
formational power in the interaction) and should be attenuated when the target 
is the high power person (since relative power is more equalized). By contrast, 
if the eff ects observed are due to something other than the power diff erential, 
experimentally manipulating power should not infl uence the extent of the be-
havioral confi rmation eff ect.
Copeland’s (1994) results support our assertion that power diff erentials in 
the dyad account for behavioral confi rmation eff ects. When the target was the 
higher power member of the dyad, no behavioral confi rmation was observed— 
targets were rated as equally extraverted for both expectations. By contrast, 
when the perceiver was the high power person, behavioral confi rmation did oc-
cur. Targets whose high power perceivers thought them to be extraverted be-
haved signifi cantly more extravertedly than did targets who were thought to be 
introverted.
Copeland’s (1994) results confi rm what the above discussion has sug gested—
the power diff erential between perceiver and target that is created by structural 
features of the behavioral confi rmation scenario leads to behavioral confi rma-
tion eff ects. In situations where that power diff erential is equalized (by giving 
the target power over the perceiver) the confi rmation eff ect disap pears. When 
the power diff erential is made greater by giving the perceiver even more power 
over the target, confi rmation continues to occur.
WHY DOES CONFIRMATION OCCUR? 
THE ROLE OF MOTIVATIONS
Having established that behavioral confi rmation results from situations in 
which, in addition to having an expectation about the target, the perceiver is in 
a posi tion of high power relative to the target, we can now turn to addressing 
the question of how and why power exerts these eff ects on the interaction pro-
cess. What is it about interpersonal interactions marked by power diff erentials 
that makes them venues in which behavioral confi rmation can occur?
Th is section focuses on looking for these explanations in the motivations 
that people bring with them to these initial interactions. Why might motiva-
tion be a good place to search for the causes of powers infl uence on behavioral 
confi rmation? First, motivations have long been held to be a determinant of the 
“perceptual concomitants” of social interaction ( Jones & Th ibaut, 1958, p. 159). 
Th e motivations that people bring with them to social interactions determine
how they perceive those interactions and how they behave during them. Sec-
ond, there is a well worked out set of motivations that people bring with them 
to social interactions—motivations that may relate to confi rmation (see Snyder, 
1992). Finally there is existing literature on the role of motivations themselves 
on the behavioral confi rmation phenomenon, literature which will provide us a 
base of knowledge from which to make inferences about powers potential role.
To make the argument that diff erences in interaction motivations are re-
sponsible for the eff ects of power on behavioral confi rmation, one must, con-
ceptually, argue for a mediational model showing, fi rst, that the motivations of 
high and low power people diff er in meaningful ways, and then showing that 
those diff erent motivations are systematically related to behavioral confi rma-
tion. Th us motivations high and low power people might bring with them to 
interpersonal interactions are discussed fi rst. Th en, after discussing the nature 
of these motivations, how motivations held on the part of perceivers and targets 
might infl uence the process of behavioral confi rmation are explored.
WHAT MOTIVATIONS DO PEOPLE HIGH AND LOW IN 
POWER BRING TO SOCIAL INTERACTIONS?
If motivations are to be implicated in the search for the causes of power diff er-
ence eff ects in acquaintanceship interactions, we fi rst need to show that people 
high and low in power are guided by diff erent motivations in the course of these 
interactions. Copeland’s (1994) study, described in detail earlier, provides evi-
dence that interaction motivations diff er for people with diff erent levels of pow-
er. In the study, high power and low power perceivers and targets were asked to 
report the strategies they used when interacting with their partners. Copeland’s 
(1994) analysis of those strategies revealed an important diff erence:
high power individuals, whether perceiver or target, were particularly likely 
to report being guided by a desire to get to know the other person, whereas low 
power individuals, again regardless of role, were particularly likely to be guid-
ed by a motivation to get along with the other person. Other researchers have 
uncovered similar motivational diff erences underlying power diff erences in in-
formation processing in person perception (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Depret, 
1996; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987).
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THESE 
INTERACTION MOTIVATIONS?
Copeland’s (1994) analysis suggests that an additional feature of power in ac-
quaintanceship interactions is that it leads individuals to have diff erent motiva-
tions guiding them during the course of the interaction. Prior to discussing 
rea sons why these motivational diff erences might exist, “getting to know” and 
“getting along” motivations must be delineated. What are people with each of
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these motivations trying to get from or accomplish through their initial interac-
tions with others?
Th ese two motivations have been identifi ed as guiding many acquaintance-
ship processes, not just those concerned with power (see Snyder, 1992, for a 
more extensive review of this literature). First, people may have as a guiding 
motivation getting to know one another—developing a stable impression of 
the other persons traits, behaviors, feelings, and values. As another motivation, 
people may be particularly interested in getting along with one another—facili-
tating pleasant, smooth interactions. In more precise language, the getting to 
know motivation involves the “acquisition and use of social knowledge,” where-
as the getting along motive involves the “regulation and facilitation of social 
inter action” (Snyder & Haugen, 1994, p. 220).
Getting To Know as an Interaction Motivation
One of the well documented functions of acquaintanceship conversations is one 
of getting to know ones interaction partner. Getting to know a person with 
whom one is interacting has obvious benefi ts—it gives a stable impression of 
the other persons thoughts, emotions, behaviors, values, preferences, and so 
forth—a stable impression that can then be used as information to guide both 
further perception and action. Several theorists have posited that having such 
information about the interaction partner helps individuals maintain a sense of 
their worlds as ordered, stable, predictable places (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones & 
Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967).
In addition to acting to gain knowledge, people may use initial acquain-
tanceship conversations as an opportunity to “check out” expectations they have 
or preliminary information they have received about the person with whom 
they will be interacting. Th is process has clear implications for behavioral con-
fi rmation scenarios, which are by defi nition critically dependent on precon-
ceived expectations. Having ones preconceived notions validated (e.g., believ ing 
that someone is an extravert and then, though behavioral confi rmation, having 
them actually behave in an extraverted manner) increases ones belief in the sta-
bility and predictability of the social world.
Th is inclusion of checking out expectations in the getting to know motiva-
tion highlights an important point about the nature of the motive—the guiding 
force behind the motivation is not necessarily formation of an accurate impres-
sion, nor is the mental picture formed through this process guaranteed to be an 
accurate one. Rather, the guiding idea is that the goal is to form a stable im-
age of the person that can then be readily used to guide further cognition and 
be havior. To the extent that this image is largely based on preexisting expecta-
tions, it may in fact be largely inaccurate. For further elaboration of this distinc-
tion between accuracy motivations and getting to know motivations, as well as 
their diff ering implications and consequences for behavioral confi rmation sce-
narios, see Snyder (1992) and Snyder and Haugen (1994, 1995).
In terms of the behavioral confi rmation scenario, perceivers who behave as 
though the expectations about others are true may be doing so in the service of 
confi rming those expectations, which satisfi es the getting to know goal of hav-
ing a stable prediction of one’s partners behavior. Th is sense of stability is, if 
anything, further reinforced when, down the line, ones partner actually starts to 
behave in ways that confi rm the expectations.
Getting Along as an Interaction Motivation
A second important motivation guiding people’s social interactions involves get-
ting along with the interaction partner—being motivated to ensure a smooth 
interaction by trying to fi t in, be responsive, and be generally accommodating 
to ones partner. Behaviors such as saying the right thing, trying to make the 
other person feel comfortable, allowing the other person to be themselves, and 
so forth all fl ow from this motivation to get along with the partner. Th is motiva-
tion helps to ensure smooth, pleasant, fl owing interactions (Goff man, 1959; 
Jones, 1990; Schlenker, 1980; Snyder, 1987).
How might this motivation relate to behavioral confi rmation? One might 
treat an interaction partner in ways dictated by expectations because, if one tru-
ly believes that is what the partner is like, then treating them in that way allows 
him or her to “be themselves.” Allowing the other person to be him- or herself 
is arguably an excellent strategy for ensuring a smooth, coordinated in teraction. 
So, from the perspective of this motivation, facilitating smooth in teractions and 
being responsive to the partners needs and dispositions may be at the heart of 
the expectation confi rming behaviors of behavioral confi rmation.
WHY DO THESE MOTIVATIONS CHARACTERIZE 
HIGH AND LOW POWER PEOPLE?
Why might power positions relate to particular patterns of interaction mo-
tives? Consider fi rst the position of the low power person. Th e low power per-
son enters the interaction being dependent on the higher power person for out-
comes—whether those outcomes be rewards, punishments, information, and so 
forth. Th is fundamental dependence, which is at the heart of power diff er ences, 
makes getting along with the partner particularly important for the low power 
person. Th is leads to the getting along motivation being a central feature of the 
low power person’s actions.
In addition, the low power person is also strongly infl uenced by impres-
sion management concerns ( Jones & Pittman, 1982). Leaving a good impres-
sion with the higher power person can help to ensure that the low power indi-
viduals get the desirable outcomes they desire. Going along and getting along 
with the high power person is one strategy for leaving that desirable impres-
sion. In fact, the low power person may not be able to “aff ord” confl ict with the
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high power person, both because of the outcome dependency and because of 
the negative impression that such confl ict may create (see Sexton & Perlman, 
1989).
What of the motivations guiding the high power person? Th e high pow-
er person is in a position of being able to exert infl uence over the low power 
per son. Th is desire to exert infl uence may manifest itself in control over the dy-
namics of the conversation. Motivation to control the conversation may involve 
taking active control of the conversation and of the topics covered (Kollock, 
Blumstein, & Schwartz, 1985; Zimmerman & West, 1975), allowing the per-
ceiver to push the agenda of forming an impression of the target.
One critical need for an ability to exert such infl uence is to be able to predict 
the actions and reactions of the lower power person (Copeland, 1994). So, the 
formation of a stable, predictable impression that is at the heart of the getting 
to know motivation may be particularly important to the high power person. In 
addition, the high power person has no need to accurately know the low power 
person (Glazer-Malbin, 1975; Miller, 1976), making reliance on ex pectations 
more likely.
HOW DO THESE MOTIVATIONS RELATE 
TO BEHAVIORAL CONFIRMATION?
Having established that these two motivations, getting to know and getting 
along, relate to the relative power held by individuals in an interaction, the im-
portant question of whether these motivations infl uence the process of behav-
ioral con fi rmation is addressed, thus adding the last link in this mediational 
chain. Does interacting in the service of one or the other of these agendas make 
a perceiver more or less likely to elicit behavioral confi rmation? Is a target act-
ing under one or the other of these agendas more likely to fall victim to behav-
ioral confi rma tion?
Snyder and Haugen (1994, 1995) conducted a series of studies to address 
these questions. In both studies, Snyder and Haugen set up a behavioral confi r-
mation scenario in which the motivations of the perceivers (Snyder & Haugen, 
1994) or of the targets (Snyder & Haugen, 1995) were experimentally manipu-
lated to be either getting to know or getting along motivations. In the getting to 
know condition, individuals were told to use the conversation as an opportuni-
ty to “check out your fi rst impressions of your partner. Find out what [the part-
ner] is like, what [the partners] personality traits are, and fi nd out what some-
one with [the partners] personality can be expected to say and do.” Individuals 
in the getting along condition were told to use strategies that “will allow you to 
get along with the type of person that [the partner] might be, making sure that 
the two of you have a smooth and pleasant conversation ...” (Snyder & Haugen, 
1994, p.228).
What did Snyder and Haugen (1994,1995) discover about motivations and 
behavioral confi rmation? Th ey found that, when the perceiver had a motivation
to get to know the target, to form a stable impression of the targets traits and 
behaviors, both perceptual and behavioral confi rmation occurred. Perceivers 
with getting along functions and control perceivers did not report perceptu-
al confi rmation and did not elicit behavioral confi rmation. Similar results were 
found when Copeland and Snyder (1995) gave students playing the role of 
coun selors instructions to diagnose their clients versus instructions to establish 
rap port with their clients. Also consistent with this fi nding, perceivers who are 
concerned with getting their interaction partners to like them do not report 
perceptual confi rmation (Neuberg et al, 1993).
For perceivers, a getting to know motivation seems to elicit behavioral con-
fi rmation whereas getting along does not. What about the motivations that tar-
gets bring to an interaction? Here, the getting to know condition did not elic-
it perceptual and behavioral confi rmation. Instead, for target motivations, be-
ing motivated to get along led to behavioral confi rmation (see also Smith et al., 
1997).
What are we to conclude from these two studies? When describing the mo-
tivational conditions that elicit behavioral confi rmation, situations in which the 
perceiver is guided by a getting to know motive and the target is guided by a 
getting along motive seem to elicit confi rmation. By contrast, confi rmation is 
attenuated and even eliminated in situations in which the target has a get to 
know motive and the perceiver has a getting along motive.
PUTTING TOGETHER THE PIECES: 
POWER, MOTIVATION, AND CONFIRMATION
Again, let us pause to tie together the various threads that have characterized 
our discussion of power, motivation, and behavioral confi rmation. First, we have 
seen that high and low power people typically enter interactions with diff er-
ent motivations—high power people are guided by a desire to get to know the 
other person whereas low power people are guided by a motivation to get along 
with the person. Th ese motivations may be a result of the diff erences in out-
come dependency that characterize high and low power people.
Next, we have seen that these motivations relate diff erentially to behav ioral 
confi rmation. When the perceiver is guided by a getting to know motiva tion and 
the target is guided by a getting along motivation, confi rmation is par ticularly 
likely to occur. Conversely, when the target is guided by getting to know and 
the perceiver by getting along, confi rmation does not occur.
We now begin to see the full range of possible linkages between confi rma-
tion and power. Power diff erences may set up situations in which the high pow-
er person is particularly likely to be the perceiver, both because of role relat-
ed power diff erences and diff erences in power due to information. High power 
perceivers are particularly likely to induce confi rmation. In addition, high power 
people are particularly likely to be guided by getting to know motivations—a 
motivation that, in its own right, also leads to confi rmation. Th us, the dynamics
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of interactions marked by power diff erences may work synergistically to lead to 
confi rmation—position, power, and motivation are all guiding the interaction 
in ways that lead to expectations being confi rmed.
Th e direct and defi nitive test of these relationships, of course, would be an 
exploration of the extent to which the relationship between power and confi r-
mation is actually mediated by motivational diff erences. To our knowledge, 
however, no study has fully explored this relationship. Such a study would be a 
useful step in furthering research on behavioral confi rmation and power. Ei ther 
orthogonally manipulating power, expectation, and motivation in the same de-
sign, in order to explore their interacting eff ects, or doing a mediational analy-
sis of the role of motivation in linking power and confi rmation would provide a 
critical piece of knowledge about the role that motivation plays in determining 
powers infl uence on behavioral confi rmation.
BROADENING THE PERSPECTIVE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Th is chapter has so far established that power diff erences fundamentally shape 
the dynamics of interpersonal interactions by the infl uence they have on the 
form and consequences of initial acquaintanceship conversations and has fur-
ther explored some of the reasons for these diff erences by examining the diff er-
ences in motivations that high and low power individuals bring with them to 
interactions. Th ese analyses are now built upon to off er some observations and 
speculations about the implications that the analysis may have for a fuller un-
derstanding of the nature and consequences of interpersonal interaction and 
power. We seek to broaden the scope of the analysis fi rst by extending the un-
derstanding of power diff erences and interpersonal interaction from situation-
ally based power diff erences to dispositional diff erences in power and then by 
ex ploring the implications and consequences of the interpersonal dynamic of in-
teraction to the group level, looking at the consequences of interpersonal power 
for stereotyping and intergroup processes.
FROM SITUATIONAL TO DISPOSITIONAL 
SOURCES OF POWER DIFFERENTIALS
Th e discussion so far has centered on situations in which there are clear cut 
(and often assigned) power diff erentials: the experimenter assigns one person 
to be the perceiver and one person to be the target, by function of social roles 
the teacher and the job supervisor have more power than the student and the 
employee, the person with the ability to give a reward has a fairly unambiguous 
power over the person who does not have such a reward. Each of these power 
diff erences, though, are really more based on features of situations than on fea-
tures of persons.
Many actual interactions do not feature such clear cut situation-based power 
diff erences. Neither are most interactions so neatly planned that only one per son 
has an expectation about the other. What will happen in such situations? Will con-
fi rmation simply not occur, even if one person has an expectation about the other? 
Or will one person naturally step into the role of the high power perceiver whereas 
another person may more naturally play the part of the lower power target?
Research on dispositional diff erences in the propensity to power suggests the 
possibility that the latter possibility may actually occur. Research on the need 
for power (e.g., Veroff  & Veroff , 1972; Winter, 1973) as well as work on Ma-
chiavellianism (e.g., Christie & Gets, 1970) suggest that some people are more 
likely to seek power positions than are others. Along with that, some of the 
work on the consequences of those dispositions for both cognition and be havior 
suggests that those people more likely to seek positions of power may also be 
more likely to adapt getting to know motivations and to behave in ways that 
elicit confi rmation, thus functionally making them perceivers.
In terms of Machiavellianism, those high in the disposition are more likely to 
become leaders in group settings (Geis, 1968) and are more likely to be seen as 
leaders by others (Geis, Krupat, & Berger, 1970). It has also been hypoth esized 
that high Machiavellians have a focus on getting the task done and work on 
stable, predictable views of their partners that will aid them in these goals (Geis, 
1968). Th ese stable, predictable views map nicely onto the getting to know mo-
tives seen earlier, with the implication that this feature of high Ma chiavellians 
may make them particularly likely to be perceivers and, because of the relation 
to the getting to know motive, may make them likely to be perceiv ers who elicit 
behavioral confi rmation from their targets.
Research on the need for power also suggests that some individuals may nat-
urally step into high power roles. Bennett (1988) has reported that individu als 
high in the need for power enjoy gaining positions and recognition for power 
and are particularly likely to assert their will in various situations. People high 
in need for power prefer situations in which they have the ability to control oth-
ers (Winter, 1973; Winter & Stewart, 1978), which may similarly make them 
likely to be behavioral confi rmation eliciting perceivers.
Th ese dispositional diff erences may lead to circumstances conducive to be-
havioral confi rmation emerging even when these diff erences are not an in herent 
feature of the social structure. Th is analysis suggests that confi rmation may be a 
more ubiquitous eff ect than at fi rst is evident; it may come to bear on situations 
that are not inherently marked by either power diff erences or par ticular patterns 
of motivations.
FROM INTERPERSONAL TO INTERGROUP SOURCES OF 
POWER DIFFERENTIALS
One of the most insidious eff ects suggested by the work on power and behav-
ioral confi rmation concerns its implications for the strength and negative ef-
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fects of stereotypes. Th e groups about whom individuals hold negative stereo-
types are often those who are in positions of lesser power in our society. Indeed, 
diff erences between groups about whom stereotypes are held have been shown 
to be perceived as status diff erences (Kemmelmeier, 2000).
Lower power positions are ones in which expectations about a person are 
particularly likely to be behaviorally confi rmed. As seen above, people low in 
power may be particularly likely to fall prey to confi rmation, since in addition 
to their inherent low power, they are also frequently outcome-dependent on the 
very people holding the stereotype. Th is outcome dependency may lead them 
to be particularly likely to adopt a getting along agenda, an agenda that has 
been shown to lead to behavioral confi rmation (Snyder & Haugen, 1995). In-
deed, in research suggestive of this idea, it has been shown that large confi rma-
tion eff ects are often found in dyads with a male perceiver and a female target 
(Christiansen & Rosenthal, 1982). In further support for this point about ste-
reotyping, work on the “powerful” self-fulfi lling prophesy has found that the ef-
fects of teacher expectations on student performance are higher when the stu-
dents are female, African-American, and of low socioeconomic status ( Jussim, 
Eccles, & Madon, 1996; Madon, Jussim, & Eccles, 1997). Th ese positions, of 
course, are ones that, in our society, are related to social power, thus providing 
fi eld study evidence for this point and confi rmation of the laboratory evidence 
about power and confi rmation (Copeland, 1994).
Interpersonal Confi rmation May Become 
Group Stereotype Confi rmation
Th e above discussion about the nature of stereotypes in behavioral confi rma-
tion scenarios suggests that our analysis may have implications for intergroup 
processes as well. Stereotypes, although used as expectations about individuals, 
are actually beliefs about a group of people. What happens, then, when an ex-
pectation that is based on a stereotype about a social group of which the target 
is a member is perceptually and behaviorally confi rmed? One potential impli-
cation is this: To the extent that the target is seen as a member of the group 
(i.e., perceived at a category rather than an individuating level; Brewer, 1988; 
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), the behavioral confi rmation that occurs may not only 
serve to confi rm expectations about the individual, but may in fact serve to rein-
force the existing social stereotypes about a group of people.
Research on the outgroup homogeneity eff ect has suggested that mem bers of 
outgroups are seen as “all alike” (e.g., Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Linville, 
Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Th e 
implications of this fi nding for behavioral confi rmation are that, to the extent 
that an individual is seen as just like other members of that individuals group, 
stereotypes about the group may serve as expectations for interaction with the 
individual—expectations that can then be behaviorally confi rmed.
Th e reverse implications, of behavioral confi rmation for outgroup percep-
tion, are equally impactful. To the extent that all members of a group are seen
as alike, the confi rmed expectations of the individual who is a member of that 
group may serve, because of outgroup homogeneity, as a confi rmation of the 
stereotype about that entire group. Th us, having met and interacted with one 
member of an outgroup, and seen that outgroup member confi rm ones expec-
tations, one may confi dently generalize—in “to know one of them is to know all 
of them” fashion—from that experience to the conclusion that all members of 
the outgroup would fi t the stereotype.
DOES POWER CORRUPT?
Th e analysis of possible individual diff erences leading to behavioral confi rma-
tion in mixed-power dyads and the exploration of negative eff ects of behavior-
al confi rmation at the intergroup level has implications for understanding the 
nega tive and corrupting infl uences of power as well. Th e analyses presented in 
this chapter suggest several ways in which the familiar adage that “power cor-
rupts” may, in some circumstances, become true through the process of behav-
ioral confi rmation, for the potentially negative eff ects of confi rmation may lead 
to corruption as a result of power.
Perhaps the most obvious of these implications is the potential role of Machia-
vellianism as a determinant of perceiver-target relationships. To the ex tent that be-
ing high in Machiavellianism will make a person more likely to be a high power 
perceiver, thus making confi rmation more likely, in addition to its impact on the 
likelihood of a person engaging in arguably corrupt practices (see Christie & Gets, 
1970), it is possible that confi rmation may become an instru ment for corruption. At 
a minimum, having a stable sense of others as a result of a getting to know motiva-
tion may give the high Machiavellian information needed to successfully manipu-
late others. At the other extreme, shaping behavior through confi rmation processes 
may itself be a tool of manipulation for the high Ma chiavellian.
Individual diff erences in need for power are also potentially implicated in 
the possible corrupting infl uence of power. Research on the need for power has 
suggested that those high in the disposition may be particularly likely to en-
gage in some negative practices related to corruption, such as backing out of or 
re neging on agreements (e.g., Terhune, 1968) and engaging in emotional and 
physical abuse of others (e.g., Dutton & Strachan, 1987; Winter & Stewart, 
1978). Th ese practices may be particularly characteristic of those high in the 
need for power who do not score very high on measures of social responsibility 
(e.g., Winter & Barenbaum, 1985). Th ese fi ndings, coupled with the possibil-
ity that need for power may relate to becoming a high power perceiver, suggest 
that, like Machiavellianism, for people high in need for power, behavioral con-
fi rmation may be either a concomitant phenomenon or an actual tool for engag-
ing in manipulative and perhaps corrupt relationships with others.
152                       Snyder & Kiviniemi:  Getting What They Came For In Lee-Chai & Bargh, eds., The Use and Abuse of Power                     153
Finally, the potential for behavioral confi rmation at the individual level to 
infl uence processes and relationships at the intergroup level suggests a fi nal
way in which power, through confi rmation, may corrupt. To the extent that be-
havioral confi rmation is used to reinforce existing stereotypes about diff er ent 
social groups, confi rmation may play a role in reinforcing and strengthening ex-
isting social stereotypes—stereotypes that may have the negative eff ects of sus-
taining existing inequitable social structures.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
As we have seen, power may be prevalent in social interactions. Even in dyad-
ic interactions that don’t appear to be marked by role related power diff erenc-
es, features of the situation and the people within often create power diff eren-
tials. In intergroup settings, status diff erences often play out in ways that mimic 
power, creating situations where stereotype-based interactions become power-
tinged interactions.
We have argued that this ubiquity of power diff erences has crucial impli-
cations for the dynamics and outcomes of social interaction. Indeed, the very 
process of getting acquainted with an interaction partner, the fi rst step in any 
interaction sequence or relationship, provides rich opportunities for the pro-
cesses of power to come into play. High power individuals elicit perceptual and 
behavioral confi rmation from their interaction partners of lesser power.
Th e nature of such infl uences of power diff erences is due to the diff ering 
motivations that high and low power people bring with them to interactions. 
High power people act in the service of getting to know their interaction part-
ner, whereas low power people act in the service of getting along with their 
partner. Th ese patterns of motivations, when held on the part of a perceiver and 
a target, respectively, are the very ones that lead to behavioral confi rmation.
In addition to discussing important implications for the impact of power 
diff erences on interpersonal interactions, ways in which broadening an under-
standing of the power dynamics infl uence our understanding of intergroup pro-
cesses—specifi cally the way that stereotypes and outgroup homogeneity eff ects 
may infl uence and be infl uenced by the dynamics of interpersonal interaction— 
have been discussed. Th ese intergroup eff ects suggest that the eff ects of power 
may be far more insidious than at fi rst realized. For, as the current analysis has 
tried to make clear, power is, in a sense, everywhere, coloring and infl uencing a 
wide range of social phenomena including that of interpersonal interaction. To 
seek a full understanding of the nature of social phenomena therefore should 
involve exploring both the nature and the eff ects of power in the many and var-
ied domains of social functioning.
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